In addition to plans for countering industrial espionage, terrorism and cyberwar, the Ministry of Defense is also working on plans for combating the flu pandemic
When you enter the Hôpital Foch in Suresnes near Paris (Hauts-de-Seine), the first thing you notice are the coarse orange posters with which the Ministry of Health wants to inoculate the population with behavioral measures to prevent the new A/H1N1 flu. Those who want to escape the disease should wash their hands regularly, use a handkerchief to sneeze, and call the doctor when they notice the first signs of infection.
At the hospital, two members of the medical staff had been infected with the H1N1 virus at the end of July. Twenty patients at risk of infection were placed in quarantines and treated with the antiviral drug Tamiflu. In addition, a crisis team was established, which called the senior staff together every day at 3 p.m. for a situation briefing. All employees of the affected pulmonary department had to wear masks. Those who showed flu symptoms were immediately examined and isolated at home. After 11 days, the safety inspections were lifted again.
Already since January the personnel had been prepared for such an event with emergency drills. Many physicians, however, were unsettled by the way the government took control of the measurements. Until now, it was unknown to what extent the fight against H1N1 flu in France is coordinated by the army.
The militarization of the fight against influenza
"In the end we follow the instructions of the military", reports an employee of the hospital to Telepolis. One gets the impression of being in the middle of a war. This is not entirely wrong: The national pandemic influenza prevention and response plan (Plan national de prevention et de lutte "Pandemic influenza") was elaborated by the French militar.
The Secretariat general de la defense nationale (SGDN), a body attached to the Prime Minister that for a long time coordinated the work of the intelligence services, is responsible for this. This secretariat deals with the preparation of government contingency plans and advises on defense matters. For example, the SGDN created the national anti-terrorism plan Vigipirate. Moreover, it is involved in countering economic espionage and cyberwar attacks, as well as controlling the arms trade.
As of October 2004, the SGDN is also working on the first plan to combat the H5N1 avian flu virus. This plan has been continuously expanded – and is now being applied to the H1N1 swine flu virus. The fact that the H1N1 flu is completely different from the avian flu is completely ignored: while the now virulent swine flu seems to be very contagious, but only rarely leads to death, the avian flu is hardly contagious, but is fatal in 60 percent of cases. Thus, the measures listed in the plan seem wholly inadequate to the current risk.
The National Pandemic Influenza Prevention and Response Plan specifies the measures to be taken in each of the six phases of the epidemic. The government had announced that France would contribute to the "rentree" could jump from the current level 5A (human-to-human transmission of the virus abroad) to the maximum alert level 6 (human-to-human transmission of the virus in France) in September, when vacationers return from summer vacations, which would mean, among other things, the closure of public facilities and means of transport, restrictions on air travel and medical checks at the borders. In addition, the country will be divided into defense zones and an army officer will be assigned to each prefect.
The military will then also be put to direct use. Among other things, reservists will be called up to ensure the deployment of the army in the interior. The military is to restrict access to crisis centers and defense facilities and carry out health checks. In addition, soldiers are to be deployed to distribute aid.
Forced vaccinations in autumn?
In connection with another possible measure, the leading role of the military raises unease: at the end of May, the Journal du Dimanche reported that the government was considering the forced vaccination of the entire French population if the virus spreads massively in the fall.
"No one had the right to refuse vaccination – except in the case of a medical indication" says Anne Laude of the Institut droit et sante of the Universitat Paris-V-Descartes. Forced administration of vaccine doses is questionable mainly because it deeply interferes with the rights of individuals. In addition, the side effects of vaccinations are often not assessable, a "medical indication" is therefore not to be left out in the case of anyone. Thus, such vaccinations are de facto human experiments on a crude scale. Moreover, the vaccines already ordered by the government are of no use at all if the virus changes due to mutations. In addition, there are the high vaccination costs of up to one billion euros.
Catastrophic scenarios put society in a state of shock
While it has not yet been decided whether the government will take this drastic step and how these forced vaccinations will be implemented. Nevertheless, the question arises as to what role the military could play in such compulsory vaccinations. Under certain circumstances, the opposite scenario could play out as in the film Outbreak (1995) by Wolfgang Petersen, where the military violently tries to prevent the administration of an antiserum against a bio-warfare agent.
In any case, these proposals are a good example of the thesis of the globalization critic Naomi Klein, who speaks of a state of shock into which modern societies – here, for example, by the flu scare – are put, in order to then implement drastic measures that would never have been accepted under normal circumstances. Thus, the declaration of a pandemic could lead to the population accepting restrictions on freedom and encroachments on personal rights without complaint. It is also conceivable that the clear distinction between civilian assistance and the military’s amption of sovereign functions will no longer be maintained in the event of a pandemic.
The boundaries between internal and external security are already blurring: the inhabitants of the French capital are already accustomed to encountering patrolling militaries in their daily lives. Thus, at strategic points of the Paris metro, at any time of the day, whole groups of nervous soldiers run across one’s path, their finger on the trigger of their FA-MAS assault rifles. It is clear that this military presence will not prevent an assassination attempt. This simulation of safety has the opposite effect: the passengers are constantly reminded of being targets.
Similarly, preventive militarization works in the case of the flu fight. "Today we are already under the spell of the epidemic, before it has arrived with us", the historian Silvia Berger gives cause for concern. Above all by their fight a politically exploitable threat condition is produced. Professor Bernard Debre of the National Ethics Committee also criticized the French government for creating fear among the population with its measures. He described the disease triggered by the H1N1 virus as a "disease of the future" "Flu", that is less dangerous than the normal seasonal flu.